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Abstract
It is known that if a 2-universal hash function H is applied to elements of a block source
(X1, . . . , XT ), where each item Xi has enough min-entropy conditioned on the previous
items, then the output distribution (H,H(X1), . . . , H(XT )) will be “close” to the uniform
distribution. We provide improved bounds on how much min-entropy per item is required
for this to hold, both when we ask that the output be close to uniform in statistical distance
and when we only ask that it be statistically close to a distribution with small collision
probability. In both cases, we reduce the dependence of the min-entropy on the number T
of items from 2 logT in previous work to logT , which we show to be optimal. This leads
to corresponding improvements to the recent results of Mitzenmacher and Vadhan (SODA
‘08) on the analysis of hashing-based algorithms and data structures when the data items
come from a block source.
1 Introduction
A block source is a sequence of items X = (X1, . . . ,XT ) in which each item has at least some
k bits of “entropy” conditioned on the previous ones [CG88]. Previous works [CG88, Zuc96,
MV08] have analyzed what happens when one applies a 2-universal hash function to each item
in such a sequence, establishing results of the following form:
Block-Source Hashing Theorems (informal): If (X1, . . . ,XT ) is a block source
with k bits of “entropy” per item and H is a random hash function from a 2-
universal family mapping to m ≪ k bits, then (H(X1), . . . ,H(XT )) is “close” to
the uniform distribution.
∗An extended abstract of this paper will appear in RANDOM ‘08 [CV08].
†Work done when visiting U.C. Berkeley, supported by US-Israel BSF grant 2002246 and NSF grant CNS-
0430336.
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In this paper, we prove new results of this form, achieving improved (in some cases, optimal)
bounds on how much entropy k per item is needed to ensure that the output is close to uniform,
as a function of the other parameters (the output length m of the hash functions, the number
T of items, and the “distance” from the uniform distribution). But first we discuss the two
applications that have motivated the study of Block-Source Hashing Theorems.
1.1 Applications of Block-Source Hashing
Randomness Extractors. A randomness extractor is an algorithm that extracts almost-
uniform bits from a source of biased and correlated bits, using a short seed of truly random
bits as a catalyst [NZ96]. Extractors have many applications in theoretical computer science
and have played a central role in the theory of pseudorandomness. (See the surveys [NT99,
Sha04, Vad07].) Block-source Hashing Theorems immediately yield methods for extracting
randomness from block sources, where the seed is used to specify a universal hash function.
The gain over hashing the entire T -tuple at once is that the blocks may be much shorter than
the entire sequence, and thus a much shorter seed is required to specify the universal hash
function. Moreover, many subsequent constructions of extractors for general sources (without
the block structure) work by first converting the source into a block source and performing
block-source hashing.
Analysis of Hashing-Based Algorithms. The idea of hashing has been widely applied in
designing algorithms and data structures, including hash tables [Knu98], Bloom filters [BM03],
summary algorithms for data streams [Mut03], etc. Given a stream of data items (x1, . . . , xT ),
we first hash the items into
(H(x1), . . . ,H(xT )), and carry out a computation using the hashed values. In the literature, the
analysis of a hashing algorithm is typically a worst-case analysis on the input data items, and the
best results are often obtained by unrealistically modelling the hash function as a truly random
function mapping the items to uniform and independent m-bit strings. On the other hand,
for realistic, efficiently computable hash functions (eg., 2-universal or O(1)-wise independent
hash functions), the provable performance is sometimes significantly worse. However, such
gaps seem to not show up in practice, and even standard 2-universal hash functions empirically
seem to match the performance of truly random hash functions. To explain this phenomenon,
Mitzenmacher and Vadhan [MV08] have suggested that the discrepancy is due to worst-case
analysis, and propose to instead model the input items as coming from a block source. Then
Block-Source Hashing Theorems imply that the performance of universal hash functions is close
to that of truly random hash functions, provided that each item has enough bits of entropy.
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1.2 How Much Entropy is Required?
A natural question about Block-Source Hashing Theorems is: how large does the “entropy”
k per item need to be to ensure a certain amount of “closeness” to uniform (where both the
entropy and closeness can be measured in various ways). This also has practical significance
for the latter motivation regarding hashing-based algorithms, as it corresponds to the amount
of entropy we need to assume in data items. In [MV08], they provide bounds on the entropy
required for two measures of closeness, and use these as basic tools to bound the required
entropy in various applications. The requirement is usually some small constant multiple of
log T , where T is the number of items in the source, which can be on the borderline between a
reasonable and unreasonable assumption about real-life data. Therefore, it is interesting to pin
down the optimal answers to these questions. In what follows, we first summarize the previous
results, and then discuss our improved analysis and corresponding lower bounds.
A standard way to measure the distance of the output from the uniform distribution is
by statistical distance.1 In the randomness extractor literature, classic results [CG88, ILL89,
Zuc96] show that using 2-universal hash functions, k = m + 2 log(T/ε) + O(1) bits of min-
entropy (or even Renyi entropy)2 per item is sufficient for the output distribution to be ε-close
to uniform in statistical distance. Sometimes a less stringent closeness requirement is sufficient,
where we only require that the output distribution is ε-close to a distribution having “small”
collision probability3. A result of [MV08] shows that k = m+2 log T + log(1/ε) +O(1) suffices
to achieve this requirement. Using 4-wise independent hash functions, [MV08] further reduce
the required entropy to k = max{m+ log T, 1/2(m + 3 log T + log(1/ε))} +O(1).
Our Results. We reduce the entropy required in the previous results, as summarized in Ta-
ble 1. Roughly speaking, we save an additive log T bits of min-entropy (or Renyi entropy) for
all cases. We show that using universal hash functions, k = m+log T +2 log 1/ε+O(1) bits per
item is sufficient for the output to be ε-close to uniform, and k = m+log(T/ε)+O(1) is enough
for the output to be ε-close to having small collision probability. Using 4-wise independent hash
functions, the entropy k further reduces to max{m+ log T, 1/2(m+2 log T + log 1/ε)}+O(1).
The results hold even if we consider the joint distribution (H,H(X1), . . . ,H(XT )) (correspond-
ing to “strong extractors” in the literature on randomness extractors). Substituting our im-
proved bounds in the analysis of hashing-based algorithms from [MV08], we obtain similar
reductions in the min-entropy required for every application with 2-universal hashing. With
4-wise independent hashing, we obtain a slight improvement for Linear Probing, and for the
1The statistical distance of two random variables X and Y is ∆(X,Y ) = maxT |Pr[X ∈ T ] − Pr[Y ∈ T ]|,
where T ranges over all possible events.
2The min-entropy of a random variable X is H∞(X) = minx log(1/Pr[X = x]). All of the results mentioned
actually hold for the less stringent measure of Renyi entropy H2(X) = log(1/Ex←X [Pr[X = x]]).
3The collision probability of a random variable X is
P
x
Pr[X = x]2. By “small collision probability,” we
mean that the collision probability is within a constant factor of the collision probability of uniform distribution.
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Setting Previous Results Our Results
2-universal hashing m+ 2 log T + 2 log(1/ε) m+ log T + 2 log(1/ε)
ε-close to uniform [CG88, ILL89, Zuc96]
2-universal hashing m+ 2 log T + log(1/ε) [MV08] m+ log T + log(1/ε)
ε-close to small cp.
4-wise indep. hashing max{m+ log T, max{m+ log T,
ε-close to small cp. 1/2(m+ 3 log T + log 1/ε)} [MV08] 1/2(m + 2 log T + log(1/ε)}
Table 1: Our Results: Each entry denotes the min-entropy (actually, Renyi entropy) required
per item when hashing a block source of T items to m-bit strings to ensure that the output
has statistical distance at most ε from uniform (or from having collision probability within a
constant factor of uniform). Additive constants are omitted for readability.
other applications, we show that the previous bounds can already be achieved with 2-universal
hashing. The results are summarized in Table 2.
Although the log T improvement seems small, we remark that it could be significant for
practical settings of parameter. For example, suppose we want to hash 64 thousand internet
traffic flows, so log T ≈ 16. Each flow is specified by the 32-bit IP addresses and 16-bit port
numbers for the source and destination plus the 8-bit transport protocol, for a total of 104
bits. There is a noticeable difference between assuming that each flow contains 3 log T ≈ 48
vs. 4 log T ≈ 64 bits of entropy as they are only 104 bits long, and are very structured.
We also prove corresponding lower bounds showing that our upper bounds are almost
tight. Specifically, we show that when the data items have not enough entropy, then the joint
distribution (H,H(X1), . . . ,H(XT )) can be “far” from uniform. More precisely, we show that
if k = m + log T + 2 log 1/ε − O(1), then there exists a block source (X1, . . . ,XT ) with k
bits of min-entropy per item such that the distribution (H,H(X1), . . . ,H(XT )) is ε-far from
uniform in statistical distance (for H coming from any hash family). This matches our upper
bound up to an additive constant. Similarly, we show that if k = m + log T − O(1), then
there exists a block source (X1, . . . ,XT ) with k bits of min-entropy per item such that the
distribution (H,H(X1), . . . ,H(XT )) is 0.99-far from having small collision probability (for H
coming from any hash family). This matches our upper bound up to an additive constant
in case the statistical distance parameter ε is constant; we also exhibit a specific 2-universal
family for which the log(1/ε) in our upper bound is nearly tight — it cannot be reduced below
log(1/ε)− log log(1/ε). Finally, we also extend all of our lower bounds to the case that we only
consider distribution of hashed values (H(X1), . . . ,H(XT )), rather than their joint distribution
with Y . For this case, the lower bounds are necessarily reduced by a term that depends on the
size of the hash family. (For standard constructions of universal hash functions, this amounts
to log n bits of entropy, where n is the bit-length of an individual item.)
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Type of Hash Family Previous Results [MV08] Our Results
Linear Probing
2-universal hashing 4 log T 3 log T
4-wise independence 2.5 log T 2 log T
Balanced Allocations with d Choices
2-universal hashing (d+ 2) log T (d+ 1) log T
4-wise independence (d+ 1) log T —
Bloom Filters
2-universal hashing 4 log T 3 log T
4-wise independence 3 log T —
Table 2: Applications: Each entry denotes the min-entropy (actually, Renyi entropy) required
per item to ensure that the performance of the given application is “close” to the performance
when using truly random hash functions. In all cases, the bounds omit additive terms that
depend on how close a performance is desired, and we restrict to the (standard) case that the
size of the hash table is linear in the number of items being hashed. That is, m = log T +O(1).
Techniques. At a high level, all of the previous analyses for hashing block sources were loose
due to summing error probabilities over the T blocks. Our improvements come from avoiding
this linear blow-up by choosing more refined measures of error. For example, when we want the
output to have small statistical distance from uniform, the classic Leftover Hash Lemma [ILL89]
says that min-entropy k = m + 2 log(1/ε0) suffices for a single hashed block to be ε0-close to
uniform, and then a “hybrid argument” implies that the joint distribution of T hashed blocks
is Tε0-close to uniform [Zuc96]. Setting ε0 = ε/T , this leads to a min-entropy requirement of
k = m + 2 log(1/ε) + 2 log T per block. We obtain a better bound, reducing 2 log T to log T ,
by using Hellinger distance to analyze the error accumulation over blocks, and only passing to
statistical distance at the end.
For the case where we only want the output to be close to having small collision probability,
the previous analysis of [MV08] worked by first showing that the expected collision probability
of each hashed block h(Xi) is “small” even conditioned on previous blocks, then using Markov’s
Inequality to deduce that each hashed block has small collision probability except with some
probability ε0, and finally doing a union bound to deduce that all hashed blocks have small
collision probability except with probability Tε0. We avoid the union bound by working with
more refined notions of “conditional collision probability,” which enable us to apply Markov’s
Inequality on the entire sequence rather than on each block individually.
The starting point for our negative results is the tight lower bound for randomness extractors
due to Radhakrishnan and Ta-Shma [RT00]. Their methods show that if the min-entropy
parameter k is not large enough, then for any hash family, there exists a (single-block) source
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X such that h(X) is “far” from uniform (in statistical distance) for “many” hash functions
h. We then take our block source (X1, . . . ,XT ) to consist of T iid copies of X, and argue
that the statistical distance from uniform grows sufficiently fast with the number T of copies
taken. For example, we show that if two distributions have statistical distance ε, then their
T -fold products have statistical distance Ω(min{1,√T · ε}), strengthening a previous bound of
Reyzin [Rey04], who proved a bound of Ω(min{ε1/3,√T · ε}).
2 Preliminaries
Notations. All logs are based 2. We use the convention that N = 2n, K = 2k, and M = 2m.
We think of a data item X as a random variable over [N ] = {1, . . . , N}, which can be viewed
as the set of n-bit strings. A hash function h : [N ]→ [M ] hashes an item to a m-bit string. A
hash function family H is a multiset of hash functions, and H will usually denote a uniformly
random hash function drawn from H. U[M ] denotes the uniform distribution over [M ]. Let
X = (X1, . . . ,XT ) be a sequence of data items. We use X<i to denote the first i − 1 items
(X1, . . . ,Xi−1). We refer to Xi as an item or a block interchangeably. Our goal is to study the
distribution of hashed sequence (H,Y) = (H,Y1, . . . , YT )
def
= (H,H(X1), . . . ,H(XT )).
Hash Families. The truly random hash family H is the set of all functions from [N ] to [M ].
A hash family H is s-universal if for every sequence of distinct elements x1, . . . , xs ∈ [N ],
PrH [H(x1) = · · · = H(xs)] ≤ 1/M s. H is s-wise independent if for every sequence of distinct
elements x1, . . . , xs ∈ [N ], H(x1), . . . ,H(xs) are independent and uniform random variables
over [M ].
Block Sources and Collision Probability. For a random variable X, the collision proba-
bility of X is cp(X) = Pr[X = X ′] =
∑
x Pr[X = x]
2, where X ′ is an independent copy of X.
The Renyi entropy H2(X) = log(1/cp(X)) can be viewed as a measure of the amount of ran-
domness in X (In the randomness extractor literature, the entropy is measured by min-entropy
H∞(X) = minx∈supp(X) log(1/Pr[X = x]), but using the less stringent measure Renyi entropy
makes our results stronger since H2(X) ≥ H∞(X).) For an event E, (X|E) is the random
variable defined by conditioning X on E.
Definition 2.1 (Block Sources) A sequence of random variables (X1, . . . ,XT ) over [N ]
T is
a blockK-source if for every i ∈ [T ], and every x<i in the support of X<i, we have cp(Xi|X<i =
x<i) ≤ 1/K. That is, each item Xi has at least k = logK bits of Renyi entropy even after
conditioning on the previous items.
Let X = (X1, . . . ,XT ) be a sequence of random variables over [M ]
T . We are interested
in bounding the overall collision probability cp(X) by the collision probability of each blocks.
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Suppose all Xi’s are independent, then cp(X) =
∏T
i=1 cp(Xi). The following lemma generalizes
Lemma 4.2 in [MV08], which says that if for every x ∈ X, the average collision probability of
every block Xi conditioning on X<i = x<i is small, then the overall collision probability cp(X)
is also small. In particular, if X is a block K-source, then cp(X) ≤ 1/KT .
Lemma 2.2 Let X = (X1, . . . ,XT ) be a sequence of random variables such that for every
x ∈ supp(X),
1
T
T∑
i=1
cp(Xi|X<i=x<i) ≤ α.
Then the overall collision probability satisfies cp(X) ≤ αT .
Proof. By Arithmetic Mean-Geometric Mean Inequality, the inequality in the premise implies
T∏
i=1
cp(Xi|X<i=x<i) ≤ αT .
Therefore, it suffices to prove
cp(X) ≤ max
x∈supp(X)
T∏
i=1
cp(Xi|X<i=x<i).
We prove it by induction on T . The base case T = 1 is trivial. Suppose the lemma is true for
T − 1. We have
cp(X) =
∑
x1
Pr[X1 = x1]
2 · cp(X2, . . . ,XT |X1=x1)
≤
(∑
x1
Pr[X1 = x1]
2
)
·max
x1
cp(X2, . . . ,XT |X1=x1)
≤ cp(X1) ·max
x1
(
max
x2,...,xT
T∏
i=2
cp(Xi|X<i=x<i)
)
= max
x
T∏
i=1
cp(Xi|X<i=x<i),
as desired.
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Statistical Distance. The statistical distance is a standard way to measure the distance of
two distributions. Let X and Y be two random variables. The statistical distance of X and Y
is ∆(X,Y ) = maxT |Pr[X ∈ T ] − Pr[Y ∈ T ]| = (1/2) ·
∑
x |Pr[X = x]− Pr[Y = x]|, where T
ranges over all possible events. When ∆(X,Y ) ≤ ε, we say that X is ε-close to Y . Similarly, if
∆(X,Y ) ≥ ε, then X is ε-far from Y . The following standard lemma says that if X has small
collision probability, then X is close to uniform in statistical distance.
Lemma 2.3 Let X be a random variable over [M ] such that cp(X) ≤ (1 + ε)/M . Then
∆(X,U[M ]) ≤
√
ε.
Conditional Collision Probability. Let (X,Y ) be jointly distributed random variables.
We can define the conditional Renyi entropy of X conditioning on Y as follows.
Definition 2.4 The conditional collision probability of X conditioning on Y is cp(X|Y ) =
Ey←Y [cp(X|Y=y)]. The conditional Renyi entropy is H2(X|Y ) = log 1/cp(X|Y ).
The following lemma says that as in the case of Shannon entropy, conditioning can only
decrease the entropy.
Lemma 2.5 Let (X,Y,Z) be jointly distributed random variables. We have cp(X) ≤ cp(X|Y ) ≤
cp(X|Y,Z).
Proof. For the first inequality, we have
cp(X) =
∑
x
Pr[X = x]2
=
∑
y,y′
Pr[Y = y] · Pr[Y = y′] ·
(∑
x
Pr[X = x|Y = y] · Pr[X = x|Y = y′]
)
≤
∑
y,y′
Pr[Y = y] · Pr[Y = y′] ·
(∑
x
Pr[X = x|Y = y]2
)1/2
·
(∑
x
Pr[X = x|Y = y′]2
)1/2
= E
y←Y
[
cp(X|Y = y)1/2
]2
≤ cp(X|Y )
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For the second inequality, observe that for every y in the support of Y , we have cp(X|Y=y) ≤
cp((X|Y =y)|(Z|Y =y)) from the first inequality. It follows that
cp(X|Y ) = E
y←Y
[cp(X|Y=y)]
≤ E
y←Y
[cp((X|Y =y)|(Z|Y=y))]
= E
y←Y
[ E
z←(Z|Y=y)
[cp(X|Y=y,Z=z)]
= cp(X|Y,Z)
3 Positive Results: How Much Entropy is Sufficient?
In this section, we present our positive results, showing that the distribution of hashed sequence
(H,Y) = (H,H(X1), . . . ,H(XT )) is close to uniform when H is a random hash function from
a 2-universal hash family, and X = (X1, . . . ,XT ) has sufficient entropy per block. The new
contribution is that we will not need K = 2k to be as large as in previous works, and so save
the required randomness in the block source X = (X1, . . . ,XT ).
3.1 Small Collision Probability Using 2-universal Hash Functions
Let H : [N ] → [M ] be a random hash function from a 2-universal family H. We first study
the conditions under which (H,Y) = (H,H(X1), . . . ,H(XT )) is ε-close to having collision
probability O(1/(|H| · MT )). This requirement is less stringent than (H,Y) being ε-close
to uniform in statistical distance, and so requires less bits of entropy. Mitzenmacher and
Vadhan [MV08] show that this guarantee suffices for some hashing applications. They show
that K ≥ MT 2/ε is enough to satisfy the requirement. We save a factor of T , and show that
in fact, K ≥ MT/ε, is sufficient. (Taking logs yields the first entry in Table 1, i.e. it suffices
to have Renyi entropy k = m + log T + log(1/ε) per block.) Formally, we prove the following
theorem.
Theorem 3.1 Let H : [N ] → [M ] be a random hash function from a 2-universal family H.
Let X = (X1, . . . ,XT ) be a block K-source over [N ]
T . For every ε > 0, the hashed sequence
(H,Y) =
(H,H(X1), . . . ,H(XT )) is ε-close to a distribution (H,Z) = (H,Z1, . . . , ZT ) such that
cp(H,Z) ≤ 1|H| ·MT
(
1 +
M
Kε
)T
.
In particular, if K ≥MT/ε, then (H,Z) has collision probability at most (1+2MT/Kε)/(|H| ·
MT ).
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To analyze the distribution of the hashed sequence (H,Y), the starting point is the following
version of the Leftover Hash Lemma [BBR85, ILL89], which says that when we hash a random
variable X with enough entropy using a 2-universal hash function H, the conditional collision
probability of H(X) conditioning on H is small.
Lemma 3.2 (The Leftover Hash Lemma) Let H : [N ] → [M ] be a random hash function
from a 2-universal family H. Let X be a random variable over [N ] with cp(X) ≤ 1/K. We
have cp(H(X)|H) ≤ 1/M + 1/K.
We now sketch how the hashed block source Y = (Y1, . . . , YT ) = (H(X1), . . . ,H(XT )) is
analyzed in [MV08], and how we improve the analysis. The following natural approach is taken
in [MV08]. Since the data X is a block K-source, the Leftover Hash Lemma tells us that for
every block i ∈ [T ], if we condition on the previous blocks X<i = x<i, then the hashed value
(Yi|X<i=x<i) has small conditional collision probability, i.e. cp((Yi|X<i=x<i)|H) ≤ 1/M + 1/K.
This is equivalent to saying that the average collision probability of (Yi|X<i=x<i) over the choice
of the hash function H is small, i.e.,
E
h←H
[cp(h(Xi)|X<i=x<i)] = cp((Yi|X<i=x<i)|H) ≤
1
M
+
1
K
.
We can then use a Markov argument to say that for every block, with probability at least
1 − ε/T over h ← H, the collision probability is at most 1/M + T/(Kε). We can then take a
union bound to say that for every x ∈ supp(X), at least (1 − ε)-fraction of hash functions h
are good in the sense that cp(h(Xi)|X<i=x<i) is small for all blocks i = 1, . . . , T . [MV08] shows
that if this condition is true for every (h,x) ∈ supp(H,X), then Y is a block (1/M +T/(Kε))-
source, and thus the overall collision probability is at most (1 +MT/Kε)T /MT . [MV08] also
shows how to modify an ε-fraction of the distribution to fix the bad hash functions, and thus
complete the analysis.
The problem of the above analysis is that taking a Markov argument for each block, and
then taking a union bound incurs a loss of factor T . To avoid this, we want to apply Markov
argument only once to the whole sequence. For example, a natural thing to try is to sum over
blocks to get
E
h←H
[
1
T
T∑
i=1
cp(h(Xi)|X<i=x<i)
]
=
1
T
T∑
i=1
cp((Yi|X<i=x<i)|H) ≤
1
M
+
1
K
,
and use a Markov argument to deduce that for every x ∈ supp(X), with probability 1− ε over
h← H, the average collision probability per block satisfies
1
T
·
T∑
i=1
cp(h(Xi)|X<i=x<i) ≤
1
M
+
1
Kε
.
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We need to bound the collision probability of Y using this information. We may want to
apply Lemma 2.2, but it requires the information on (1/T )
∑T
i=1 cp(Yi|Y<i=y<i) instead of
(1/T )
∑T
i=1 cp(h(Xi)|X<i=x<i). That is, Lemma 2.2 requires us to condition on previous hashed
values Y<i, whereas the above argument refers to conditioning on the un-hashed values X<i.
The difficulty with directly reasoning about the former is that conditioned on the hashed values
Y<i, the hash function H may no longer be uniform (as it is correlated with Y<i) and thus the
Leftover Hash Lemma no longer applies.
To get around with the issues, we work with the averaged form of conditional collision
probability cp(Yi|H,Y<i), as from Definition 2.4. Our key observation is that now we can
apply Lemma 2.5 to deduce that for every block i ∈ [T ], the conditional collision probability
satisfies cp(Yi|H,Y<i) ≤ cp(Yi|H,X<i) ≤ 1/M +1/K. Then, by a Markov argument, it follows
that with probability 1− ε over (h,y)← (H,Y), the average collision probability satisfies
1
T
T∑
i=1
cp(Yi|(H,Y<i)=(h,y<i)) ≤
1
M
+
1
Kε
.
We can then modify an ε-fraction of distribution, and apply Lemma 2.2 to complete the analysis.
The following lemma formalizes our claim about that the conditional collision probability
of every block of (H,Y) is small.
Lemma 3.3 Let H : [N ]→ [M ] be a random hash function from a 2-universal family H. Let
X = (X1, . . . ,XT ) be a block K-source over [N ]
T . Let (H,Y) = (H,H(X1), . . . ,H(XT )). Then
cp(H) = 1/|H| and for every i ∈ [T ], cp(Yi|H,Y<i) ≤ 1/M + 1/K.
Proof. cp(H) = 1/|H| is trivial since H is the uniform distribution. Fix i ∈ [T ]. By the
definition of block K-source, for every x<i in the support of X<i, cp(Xi|X<i=x<i) ≤ 1/K. By
the Leftover Hash Lemma, we have cp((Yi|X<i=x<i)|(H|X<i=x<i)) ≤ 1/M + 1/K for every x<i.
It follows that cp(Yi|H,X<i) ≤ 1/M + 1/K. Now, we can think of (Yi|H,X<i) as Yi first
conditioning on (H,Y<i), and then further conditioning on X<i. By Lemma 2.5, we have
cp(Yi|H,Y<i) ≤ cp(Yi|H,Y<i,X<i) = cp(Yi|H,X<i) ≤ 1/M + 1/K,
as desired.
We use this to prove Theorem 3.1 as outlined above.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: By Lemma 3.3, for every i ∈ [T ], we have
E
(h,y)←(H,Y)
[
cp(Yi|(H,Y<i)=(h,y<i))
]
= cp(Yi|H,Y<i) ≤ 1
M
+
1
K
.
By linearity of expectation, the average conditional collision probability is also small.
E
(h,y)←(H,Y)
[
1
T
T∑
i=1
cp(Yi|(H,Y<i)=(h,y<i))
]
≤ 1
M
+
1
K
.
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Note that the collision probability of a random variable over [M ] is at least 1/M . Thus,
Markov’s inequality implies that with probability at least 1− ε over (h,y)← (H,Y),
1
T
T∑
i=1
cp(Yi|(H,Y<i)=(h,y<i)) ≤
1
M
+
1
Kε
=
1
M
·
(
1 +
M
Kε
)
. (1)
In Lemma 3.4 below, we show how to fix the bad (h,y)’s by modifying at most ε-fraction
of the distribution. Formally, Lemma 3.4 says that there exists a distribution (H,Z) =
(H,Z1, . . . , ZT ) such that (H,Y) is ε-close to (H,Z), and for every (h, z) ← (H,Z),
1
T
T∑
i=1
cp(Zi|(H,Z<i)=(h,z<i)) ≤
1
M
·
(
1 +
M
Kε
)
.
Applying Lemma 2.2 on (Z|H=h) for every h ∈ supp(H), we have
cp(H,Z) =
1
|H| · Eh←H [cp(Z|H=h)] ≤
1
|H| ·MT ·
(
1 +
M
Kε
)T
.
Lemma 3.4 Let (H,Y) = (H,Y1, . . . , YT ) be jointly distributed random variables over H ×
[M ]T such that with probability at least 1 − ε over (h,y) ← (H,Y), the average conditional
collision probability satisfies
1
T
·
T∑
i=1
cp(Yi|(H,Y<i)=(h,y<i)) ≤
1
M
+ α.
Then there exists a distribution (H,Z) = (H,Z1, . . . , ZT ) such that (H,Z) is ε-close to (H,Y),
and for every (h, z) ∈ supp(H,Z), we have
1
T
·
T∑
i=1
cp(Zi|(H,Z<i)=(h,z<i)) ≤
1
M
+ α.
Furthermore, the marginal distribution of H is unchanged.
Proof. We define the distribution (H,Z) as follows.
• Sample (h,y) ← (H,Y).
• If (1/T ) ·∑Ti=1 cp(Yi|(H,Y<i)=(h,y<i)) ≤ 1/M + α, then output (h,y).
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• Otherwise, let j ∈ [T ] be the least index such that
1
T
j∑
i=1
(
cp(Yi|(H,Y<i)=(h,y<i))−
1
M
)
≤ α and 1
T
j+1∑
i=1
(
cp(Yi|(H,Y<i)=(h,y<i))−
1
M
)
> α
• Choose wj+1, . . . , wT ← U[M ], and output (h, y1, . . . , yj , wj+1, . . . , wT ).
It is easy to check that (i) (H,Z) is well-defined, (ii) (H,Y) is ε-close to (H,Z), (iii) for every
(h, z) ∈ (H,Z), (1/T )·∑Ti=1 cp(Zi|(H,Z<i)=(h,z<i)) ≤ 1/M+α, and (iv) the marginal distribution
of H is unchanged.
3.2 Small Collision Probability Using 4-wise Independent Hash Functions
As discussed in [MV08], using 4-wise independent hash functions H : [N ] → [M ] from H, we
can further reduce the required randomness in the data X = (X1, . . . ,XT ). [MV08] shows that
in this case, K ≥ MT +
√
2MT 3/ε is enough for the hashed sequence (H,Y) to be ε-close
to having collision probability O(1/|H| · MT ). As discussed in the previous subsection, by
avoiding using union bounds, we show that K ≥MT +
√
2MT 2/ε suffices. (Taking logs yields
the second entry in Table 1, i.e. it suffices to have Renyi entropy k = max{m + log T, (1/2) ·
(m+ 2 log T + log(1/ε))} +O(1) per block.) Formally, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.5 Let H : [N ]→ [M ] be a random hash function from a 4-wise independent family
H. Let X = (X1, . . . ,XT ) be a block K-source over [N ]T . For every ε > 0, the hashed sequence
(H,Y) = (H,H(X1), . . . ,H(XT )) is ε-close to a distribution (H,Z) = (H,Z1, . . . , ZT ) such
that
cp(H,Z) ≤ 1|H| ·MT
(
1 +
M
K
+
√
2M
K2ε
)T
.
In particular, if K ≥ MT +
√
2MT 2/ε, then (H,Z) has collision probability at most (1 +
γ)/(|H| ·MT ) for γ = 2 · (MT +
√
2MT 2/ε)/K.
The improvement of Theorem 3.5 over Theorem 3.1 comes from that when we use 4-wise in-
dependent hash families, we have a concentration result on the conditional collision probability
for each block , via the following lemma.
Lemma 3.6 ([MV08]) Let H : [N ]→ [M ] be a random hash function from a 4-wise indepen-
dent family H, and X a random variable over [N ] with cp(X) ≤ 1/K. Then we have
Var
h←H
[cp(h(X))] ≤ 2
MK2
.
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We can then replace the application of Markov’s Inequality in the proof of Theorem 3.1 by
Chebychev’s Inequality to get stronger result. Formally, we prove the following lemma, which
suffices to prove Theorem 3.5.
Lemma 3.7 Let H : [N ]→ [M ] be a random hash function from a 4-wise independent family
H. Let X = (X1, . . . ,XT ) be a block K-source over [N ]T . Let (H,Y) = (H,H(X1), . . . ,H(XT )).
Then with probability at least 1− ε over (h,y)← (H,Y),
1
T
T∑
i=1
cp(Yi|(H,Y<i)=(h,y<i)) ≤
1
M
·
(
1 +
M
K
+
√
2M
K2ε
)
.
Theorem 3.5 follows immediately by composing Lemma 3.7, 3.4, and 2.2 in the same way
as the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Lemma 3.7: Recall that we have
E
(h,y)←(H,Y)
[
1
T
T∑
i=1
cp(Yi|(H,Y<i)=(h,y<i))
]
≤ 1
M
+
1
K
.
Hence, our goal is to upper bound the probability of the value (1/T )
∑T
i=1 cp(Yi|(H,Y<i)=(h,y<i))
deviating from its mean by
√
2/MK2ε. Our strategy is to bound the variance of a properly de-
fined random variable, and then apply Chebychev’s Inequality. By Lemma 3.6, the information
we get from 4-wise independent hash function is that for every i ∈ [T ], we have
Var
h←H
[
cp(Yi|(H,X<i)=(h,x<i))
] ≤ 2
MK2
∀x<i ∈ supp(X<i) (2)
Fix i ∈ [T ], let us try to bound the variance of the i-th block. There are two issues to take
care of. Firstly, the variance we have is conditioning on X<i instead of Y<i. Secondly, even
when conditioning on X<i, it is possible that the variance is
Var
(h,x)←(H,X)
[
cp(Yi|(H,X<i)=(h,x<i))
]
= Ω
(
1
K2
)
≫ 2
MK2
.
The reason is that conditioning on different X<i = x<i, the collision probability of (Yi|X<i=x<i)
may have different expectation over h← H. Thus, we have to subtract the mean first. Let us
define
f(h, x<i) = cp(Yi|(H,X<i)=(h,x<i))− E
h←H
[
cp(Yi|(H,X<i)=(h,x<i))
]
Now, for every x<i ∈ supp(X<i), f(H,x<i) has mean 0, and variance ≤ 2/MK2. It follows
that
Var
(h,x)←(H,X)
[f(h, x<i)] ≤ 2
MK2
.
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We now deal with the issue of conditioning on X<i versus Y<i. Let us define
g(h, y<i) = E
x<i←(X<i|(H,Y<i)=(h,y<i))
[f(h, x<i)] .
We claim that
cp(Yi|(H,Y<i)=(h,y<i)) ≤
1
M
+
1
K
+ g(h, y<i).
Indeed, by Lemma 2.5 and the definition of f and g,
cp(Yi|(H,Y<i)=(h,y<i))
≤ cp((Yi|(H,Y<i)=(h,y<i))|(Xi|(H,Y<i)=(h,y<i)))
= E
x<i←(X<i|(H,Y<i)=(h,y<i))
[
cp(Yi|(H,X<i)=(h,x<i))
]
= E
x<i←(X<i|(H,Y<i)=(h,y<i))
[
f(h, x<i) + E
h←H
[
cp(Yi|(H,X<i)=(h,x<i))
]]
≤ g(h, y<i) + 1
M
+
1
K
Also note that g(H,Y<i) has mean 0 and small variance:
E
(h,y<i)←(H,y<i)
[g(h, y<i)] = E
(h,x)←(H,X)
[f(h, x<i)] = 0,
Var
(h,y<i)←(H,y<i)
[g(h, y<i)] ≤ Var
(h,x)←(H,X)
[f(h, x<i)] ≤ 2
MK2
.
The above argument holds for every block i ∈ [T ]. Taking average over blocks, we get
E
(h,y)←(H,Y)
[
1
T
T∑
i=1
g(h, y<i)
]
= 0,
Var
(h,y)←(H,Y)
[
1
T
T∑
i=1
g(h, y<i)
]
≤ 2
MK2
, and
1
T
T∑
i=1
cp(Yi|(H,Y<i)=(h,y<i)) ≤
1
M
+
1
K
+
(
1
T
T∑
i=1
g(h, y<i)
)
.
Finally, we can apply Chebychev’s Inequality to random variable (1/T ) ·∑i g(H,Y<i) to get
the desired result: with probability 1− ε over (h,y)← (H,Y),
1
T
T∑
i=1
cp(Yi|(H,Y<i)=(h,y<i)) ≤
1
M
·
(
1 +
M
K
+
√
2M
K2ε
)
.
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3.3 Statistical Distance to Uniform Distribution
Let H : [N ] → [M ] be a random hash function form a 2-universal family H. Let X =
(X1, . . . ,XT ) be a block K-source over [N ]
T . In this subsection, we study the statistical
distance between the distribution of hashed sequence (H,Y) = (H,H(X1), . . . ,H(XT )) and
the uniform distribution (H,U[M ]T ). Classic results of [CG88, ILL89, Zuc96] show that if
K ≥ MT 2/ε2, then (H,Y) is ε-close to uniform. The proof idea is as follows. The Leftover
Hash Lemma together with Lemma 2.3 tells us that the joint distribution of hash function
and a hashed value (H,Yi) = (H,H(Xi)) is
√
M/K-close to uniform U[M ] even conditioning
on the previous blocks X<i. One can then use a hybrid argument to show that the distance
grows linearly with the number of blocks, so (H,Y) is T ·
√
M/K-close to uniform. Taking
K ≥MT 2/ε2 completes the analysis.
We save a factor of T , and show that in fact, K =MT/ε2 is sufficient. (Taking logs yields
the third entry in Table 1, i.e. it suffices to have Renyi entropy k = m+ log T + 2 log(1/ε) per
block.) Formally, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.8 Let H : [N ] → [M ] be a random hash function from a 2-universal family H.
Let X = (X1, . . . ,XT ) be a block K-source over [N ]
T . For every ε > 0 such that K > MT/ε2,
the hashed sequence (H,Y) = (H,H(X1), . . . ,H(XT )) is ε-close to uniform (H,U[M ]T ).
Recall that the previous analysis goes by passing to statistical distance first, and then
measuring the growth of distance using statistical distance. This incurs a quadratic dependency
of K on T . Since without further information, the hybrid argument is tight, to save a factor
of T , we have to measure the increase of distance over blocks in another way, and pass to
statistical distance only in the end. It turns out that the Hellinger distance (cf., [GS02]) is a
good measure for our purposes:
Definition 3.9 (Hellinger distance) Let X and Y be two random variables over [M ]. The
Hellinger distance between X and Y is
d(X,Y )
def
=
(
1
2
∑
i
(
√
Pr[X = i]−
√
Pr[Y = i])
)1/2
=
√
1−
∑
i
√
Pr[X = i] · Pr[Y = i].
Like statistical distance, Hellinger distance is a distance measure for distributions, and it
takes value in [0, 1]. The following standard lemma says that the two distance measures are
closely related. We remark that the lemma is tight in both directions even if Y is the uniform
distribution.
Lemma 3.10 (cf., [GS02]) Let X and Y be two random variables over [M ]. We have
d(X,Y )2 ≤ ∆(X,Y ) ≤
√
2 · d(X,Y ).
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In particular, the lemma allows us to upper-bound the statistical distance by upper-bounding
the Hellinger distance. Since our goal is to bound the distance to uniform, it is convenient to
introduce the following definition.
Definition 3.11 (Hellinger Closeness to Uniform) Let X be a random variable over [M ].
The Hellinger closeness of X to uniform U[M ] is
C(X)
def
=
1
M
∑
i
√
M · Pr[X = i] = 1− d(X,U[M ])2.
Note that C(X,Y ) = C(X) ·C(Y ) when X and Y are independent random variables, so the
Hellinger closeness is well-behaved with respect to products (unlike statistical distance). By
Lemma 3.10, if the Hellinger closeness C(X) is close to 1, thenX is close to uniform in statistical
distance. Recall that collision probability behaves similarly. If the collision probability cp(X)
is close to 1/M , then X is close to uniform. In fact, by the following normalization, we can
view the collision probability as the 2-norm of X, and the Hellinger closeness as the 1/2-norm
of X.
Let f(i) =M · Pr[X = i] for i ∈ [M ]. In terms of f(·), the collision probability is cp(X) =
(1/M2) ·∑i f(i)2, and Lemma 2.3 says that if the “2-norm” M · cp(X) = Ei[f(i)2] ≤ 1 + ε
where the expectation is over uniform i ∈ [M ], then ∆(X,U) ≤ √ε,. Similarly, Lemma 3.10
says that if the “1/2-norm” C(X) = Ei[
√
f(i)] ≥ 1− ε, then ∆(X,U) ≤ √ε.
We now discuss our approach to prove Theorem 3.8. We want to show that (H,Y) is close to
uniform. All we know is that the conditional collision probability cp(Yi|H,Y<i) is close to 1/M
for every block. If all blocks are independent, then the overall collision probability cp(H,Y)
is small, and so (H,Y) is close to uniform. However, this is not true without independence,
since 2-norm tends to over-weight heavy elements. In contrast, the 1/2-norm does not suffer
this problem. Therefore, our approach is to show that small conditional collision probability
implies large Hellinger closeness. Formally, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.12 Let X = (X1, . . . ,XT ) be jointly distributed random variables over [M1]× · · · ×
[MT ] such that cp(Xi|X<i) ≤ αi/Mi for every i ∈ [T ]. Then the Hellinger closeness satisfies
C(X) ≥
√
1
α1 . . . αT
.
With this lemma, the proof of Theorem 3.8 is immediate.
Proof of Theorem 3.8: By Lemma 3.3, cp(H) = 1/|H|, and cp(Yi|H,Y<i) ≤ (1+M/K)/M
for every i ∈ [T ]. By Lemma 3.12, the Hellinger closeness satisfies C(H,Y) ≥ (1+M/K)−T/2 ≥
1−MT/2K (recall that K ≥MT/ε2). It follows by Lemma 3.10 that
∆((H,Y), (H,U[M ]T )) ≤
√
2 · d((H,Y), (H,U[M ]T )) =
√
2 ·
√
1− C(H,Y) ≤
√
MT/K ≤ ε.
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We proceed to prove Lemma 3.12. The main idea is to use Ho¨lder’s inequality to relate two
different norms. We recall Ho¨lder’s inequality first.
Lemma 3.13 (Ho¨lder’s inequality[Dur04])
• Let F,G be two non-negative functions from [M ] to R, and p, q > 0 satisfying 1/p+1/q =
1. Let x be a uniformly random index over [M ]. We have
E
x
[F (x) ·G(x)] ≤ E
x
[F (x)p]1/p · E
x
[G(x)q]1/q.
• In general, let F1, . . . , Fn be non-negative functions from [M ] to R, and p1, . . . pn > 0
satisfying 1/p1 + . . . 1/pn = 1. We have
E
x
[F1(x) · · ·Fn(x)] ≤ E
x
[F1(x)
p1 ]1/p1 · · ·E
x
[Fn(x)
pn ]1/pn .
Proof of Lemma 3.12: We prove it by induction on T . The base case T = 1 is already
non-trivial. Let X be a random variable over [M ] with cp(X) ≤ α/M , we need to show that
the Hellinger closeness C(X) ≥ √1/α. Recall the normalization we mentioned before. Let
f(x) =M ·Pr[X = x] for every x ∈ [M ]. In terms of f(·), we want to show that Ex[f(x)2] ≤ α
implies Ex[
√
f(x)] ≥
√
1/α. Note that Ex[f(x)] = 1. We now apply Ho¨lder’s inequality with
F = f2/3, G = f1/3, p = 3, and q = 3/2. We have
E
x
[f(x)] ≤ E
x
[f(x)2]1/3 · E
x
[f(x)1/2]2/3,
which implies
C(X) = E
x
[
√
f(x)] ≥ E
x
[f(x)]3/2/E
x
[f(x)2]1/2 ≥
√
1/α.
Suppose the lemma is true for T − 1, we show that it is true for T . Let f(x) = M1 ·
Pr[X1 = x]. To apply the induction hypothesis, we consider the conditional random variables
(X2, . . . ,XT |X1=x) for every x ∈ [M1]. For every x ∈ [M1] and j = 2, . . . , T , we define
gj(x) = Mj · cp((Xj |X1=x)|(X2, . . . ,Xj−1|X1=x)) to be the ”normalized” conditional collision
probability. By induction hypothesis, we have C(X2, . . . ,XT |X1=x) ≥
√
g2(x) · · · gT (x) for
every x ∈ [M1]. It follows that
C(X) = E
x
[
√
f(x) · C(X2, . . . ,XT |X1=x)] ≥ E
x
[
√
f(x)/g2(x) · · · gT (x)].
We use Ho¨lder’s inequality twice to show that Ex[
√
f(x)/g2(x) · · · gT (x)] ≥
√
1/α1 · · ·αT .
Let us first summarize the constraints we have. By definition, we have Ex[f(x)
2] ≤ α1. Fix
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j ∈ {2, . . . , T}. Note that
cp(Xj |X<j)
= E
x←X1
[cp((Xj |X1=x)|(X2, . . . ,Xj−1|X1=x))]
= E
x←X1
[gj(x)/Mj ]
= E
x←U[M]
[f(x)gj(x)]/Mj
It follows that Ex[f(x)gj(x)] ≤ αj for j = 2, . . . , T . Now, we apply the second version of
Ho¨lder’s Inequality with F1 = (f/g2 · · · gT )1/2, Fj = (fgj)1/(T+1) for j = 2, . . . , T , p1 = 2/(T +
1), and pj = 1/(T + 1) for j = 2, . . . , T , which gives
E
x
[
f(x)T/(T+1)
]
≤ E
x
[√
f(x)/g2(x) · · · gT (x)
]2/(T+1)
·E
x
[f(x)g2(x)]
1/(T+1) · · ·E
x
[f(x)gT (x)]
1/(T+1) ,
so
E
x
[√
f(x)/g2(x) · · · gT (x)
]
≥ E
x
[
f(x)T/(T+1)
](T+1)/2
·
T∏
j=2
E
x
[f(x)gj(x)]
−1/2
≥ E
x
[
f(x)T/(T+1)
](T+1)/2
·
√
1/α2 · · ·αT .
It remains to lower bound the first term by
√
1/α1. We apply Ho¨lder again with F = f
2/(T+2),
G = fT/(T+2), p = T + 2, and q = (T + 2)/(T + 1), which gives
E
x
[f(x)] ≤ E
x
[
f(x)2
]1/(T+2) · E
x
[
f(x)T/(T+1)
](T+1)/(T+2)
,
so
E
x
[
f(x)T/(T+1)
](T+1)/2
≥ E
x
[f(x)](T+2)/2 /E
x
[
f(x)2
]1/2 ≥√1/α1.
Combining the inequalities, we have C(X) ≥
√
1/α1 · · ·αT .
4 Negative Results: How Much Entropy is Necessary?
In this section, we provide lower bounds on the entropy needed for the data items. We show
that if K is not large enough, then for every hash family H, there exists a block K-source
X = (X1, . . . ,XT ) such that the hashed sequence Y = (H(X1), . . . ,H(XT )) do not satisfy the
desired closeness requirements to uniform (possibly in conjunction with the hash function H).
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4.1 Lower Bound for Statistical Distance to Uniform Distribution
Let us first consider the requirement for the joint distribution of (H,Y) being ε-close to uniform.
When there is only one block, this is exactly the requirement for a “strong extractor”. The
lower bound in the extractor literature, due to Radhakrishnan and Ta-Shma [RT00] shows that
K ≥ Ω(M/ε2) is necessary, which is tight up to a constant factor. Our goal is to show that
when hashing T blocks, the value of K required for each block increases by a factor of T .
Intuitively, each block will produce some error (i.e., the hashed value is not close to uniform),
and the overall error will accumulate over the blocks, so we need to inject more randomness
per block to reduce the error. Indeed, we use this intuition to show that K ≥ Ω(MT/ε2)
is necessary for the hashed sequence to be ε-close to uniform, matching the upper bound in
Theorem 3.8. Note that the lower bound holds even for a truly random hash family. Formally,
we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1 Let N,M, and T be positive integers and ε ∈ (0, ε0) a real number such that
N ≥MT/ε2, where ε0 > 0 is a small absolute constant. Let H : [N ]→ [M ] be a random hash
function from an hash family H. Then there exists an integer K = Ω(MT/ε2), and a block
K-source X = (X1, . . . ,XT ) such that (H,Y) = (H,H(X1), . . . ,H(XT )) is ε-far from uniform
(H,U[M ]T ) in statistical distance.
To prove the theorem, we need to find such an X for every hash family H. Following the
intuition, we find an X that incurs certain error on a single block, and take X = (X1, . . . ,XT )
to be T i.i.d. copies of X. More precisely, we first find a K-source X such that for Ω(1)-fraction
of hash functions h ∈ H, h(X) is Ω(ε/√T )-far from uniform. This step is the same as the lower
bound proof for extractors [RT00], which uses the probabilistic method. We pick X to be a
random flat K-source, i.e., a uniform distribution over a random set of size K, and show that
X satisfies the desired property with nonzero probability. The next step is to measure how the
error accumulates over independent blocks. Note that for a fixed hash function h, the hashed
sequence (h(X1), . . . , h(XT )) consists of T i.i.d. copies of h(X). Reyzin [Rey04] has shown that
the statistical distance increases
√
T when we have T independent copies for small T . However,
Reyzin’s result only shows an increase up to distance O(δ1/3), where δ is the statistical distance
of the original random variables. We improve Reyzin’s result to show that the Ω(
√
T ) growth
continues until the distance reaches some absolute constant. We then use it to show that the
joint distribution (H,Y) is far from uniform.
The following lemma corresponds to the first step.
Lemma 4.2 Let N and M be positive integers and ε ∈ (0, 1/4), δ ∈ (0, 1) real numbers such
that N ≥ M/ε2. Let H : [N ] → [M ] be a random hash function from an hash family H.
Then there exists an integer K = Ω(δ2M/ε2), and a flat K-source X over [N ] such that with
probability at least 1− δ over h← H, h(X) is ε-far from uniform.
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Proof. Let K = ⌊min{α ·M/ε2, N/2}⌋ for some α to be determined later. Let X be a random
flat K-source over [N ]. That is, X = US where S ⊂ [N ] is a uniformly random size K subset
of [N ]. We claim that for every hash function h : [N ]→ [M ],
Pr
S
[ h(US) is ε-far from uniform ] ≥ 1− c ·
√
α (3)
for some absolute constant c. Let us assume (3), and prove the lemma first. Since the claim
holds for every hash function h,
Pr
h←H,S
[ h(US) is ε-far from uniform ] ≥ 1− c ·
√
α.
Thus, there exists a flat K-source US such that
Pr
h←H
[ h(US) is ε-far from uniform ] ≥ 1− c ·
√
α.
The lemma follows by setting α = min{δ2/c2, 1/32}. We proceed to prove (3). It suffices to
show that for every y ∈ [M ], with probability at least 1− c′ ·√α over random US, the deviation
of Pr[h(US) = y] from 1/M is at least 4ε/M , where c
′ is another absolute constant. That is,
Pr
S
[∣∣∣∣Pr[h(US) = y]− 1M
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 4εM
]
≥ 1− c′ · √α. (4)
Again, let us see why (4) is sufficient to prove (3) first. Let us call y ∈ [M ] is bad for S if∣∣∣∣Pr[h(US) = y]− 1M
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 4εM .
Since Inequality (4) holds for every y ∈ [M ], we have
Pr
S,y
[y is bad for S] ≥ 1− c′ · √α,
where y is uniformly random over [M ]. It follows that
Pr
S
[at least 1/2-fraction of y are bad for S] ≥ 1− 2c′ · √α
Observe that if at least 1/2-fraction of y are bad for S, then ∆(h(X), U[M ]) ≥ ε. Inequality (3)
follows by setting c = 2c′.
It remains to prove (4). Let T = h−1(y). We have PrS[h(US) = y] = |S ∩ T |/|S|. Thus,
recall that K ≤ αM/ε2, (4) follows from inequality
Pr
S
[∣∣∣∣|S ∩ T | − KM
∣∣∣∣ < 4KεM
]
≤ c′ ·
√
Kε2
M
,
which follows by the claim below by setting L = K/M , and β = 4ε
√
K/M (Working out the
parameters, we have c′ = 4c′′, ε < 1/4 implies β <
√
L, and α ≤ 1/32 implies β < 1.)
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Claim 4.3 Let N,K > 1 be positive integers such that N > 2K, and L ∈ [0,K/2], β ∈
(0,min{1,√L}) real numbers. Let S ⊂ [N ] be a random subset of size K, and T ⊂ [N ] be a
fixed subset of arbitrary size. We have
Pr
S
[
||S ∩ T | − L| ≤ β
√
L
]
≤ c′′ · β,
for some absolute constant c′′.
Intuitively, the probability in the claim is maximized when the set T has size NL/K so that
L = ES [|S ∩ T |], and the claim follows by observing that in this case, the distribution has
deviation Θ(
√
L), and each possible outcome has probability O(
√
1/L). The formal proof of
the claim is in Appendix A and is proved by expressing the probability in terms of binomial
coefficients, and estimating them using Stirling formula.
The next step is to measure the increase of statistical distance over independent random
variables.
Lemma 4.4 Let X and Y be random variables over [M ] such that ∆(X,Y ) ≥ ε. Let X =
(X1, . . . ,XT ) be T i.i.d. copies of X, and let Y = (Y1, . . . , YT ) be T i.i.d. copies of Y . We
have
∆(X,Y) ≥ min{ε0, c
√
T · ε},
where ε0, c are absolute constants.
We defer the proof of the above lemma to Appendix B.
Proof of Theorem 4.1: The absolute constant ε0 in the theorem is a half of the ε0 in
Lemma 4.4. By Lemma 4.2 there is a flat K-source such that for 1/2-fraction of hash functions
h ∈ H, h(X) is (2ε/c√T )-far from uniform, for K = Ω((1/2)2M/(2ε/c√T )2) = Ω(MT/ε2).
We set X = (X1, . . . ,XT ) to be T independent copies of X. Consider a hash function h such
that h(X) is (2ε/c
√
T )-far from uniform. By Lemma 4.4, (h(X1), . . . , h(XT )) is 2ε-far from
uniform. Note that this holds for 1/2-fraction of hash function h. It follows that
∆((H,Y), (H,U[M ])) = E
h←H
[
∆((h(X1), . . . , h(XT ), U[M ]T )
]
≥ 1
2
· 2ε = ε.
4.2 Lower Bound for Small Collision Probability
In this subsection, we prove lower bounds on the entropy needed per item to ensure that the
sequence of hashed values is close to having small collision probability. Since this requirement is
less stringent than being close to uniform, less entropy is needed from the source. The interest-
ing setting in applications is to require the hashed sequence (H,Y) = (H,H(X1), . . . ,H(XT ))
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to be ε-close to having collision probability O(1/(|H| ·MT )). Recall that in this setting, instead
of requiring K ≥MT/ε2, K ≥ Ω(MT/ε) is sufficient for 2-universal hash functions (Theorem
3.1), and K ≥ Ω(MT + T
√
M/ε) is sufficient for 4-wise independent hash functions (Theorem
3.5). The main improvement from 2-universal to 4-wise independent hashing is the better de-
pendency on ε. Indeed, it can be shown that if we use truly random hash functions, we can
reduce the dependency on ε to log(1/ε). Since we are now proving lower bounds for arbitrary
hash families, we focus on the dependency on M and T . Specifically, our goal is to show that
K = Ω(MT ) is necessary. More precisely, we show that when K ≪ MT , it is possible for the
hashed sequence (H,Y) to be .99-far from any distribution that has collision probability less
than 100/(|H| ·MT ).
We use the same strategy as in the previous subsection to prove this lower bound. Fixing a
hash family H, we take T independent copies (X1, . . . ,XT ) of the worst-case X found in Lemma
4.2, and show that (H,H(X1), . . . ,H(XT )) is far from having small collision probability. The
new ingredient is to show that when we have T independent copies, and K ≪ MT , then
(h(X1), . . . , h(XT )) is very far from uniform (say, 0.99-far) for many h ∈ H. We then argue
that in this case, we can not reduce the collision probability of (h(X1), . . . , h(XT )) by changing
a small fraction of distribution, which implies the overall distribution (H,Y) is far from any
distribution (H ′,Z) with small collision probability. Formally, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.5 Let N,M, and T be positive integers such that N ≥ MT . Let δ ∈ (0, 1) and
α > 1 be real numbers such that α < δ3 · eT/32/128. Let H : [N ] → [M ] be a random hash
function from a hash family H. There exists an integer K = Ω(δ2MT/ log(α/δ)), and a block
K-source X = (X1, . . . ,XT ) such that (H,Y) = (H,H(X1), . . . ,H(XT )) is (1 − δ)-far from
any distribution (H ′,Z) with cp(H ′,Z) ≤ α/(|H| ·MT ).
Think of α and δ as constants. Then the theorem says that K = Ω(MT ) is necessary for
the hashed sequence (H,H(X1), . . . ,H(XT )) to be close to having small collision probability,
matching the upper bound in Theorem 3.1. In the previous proof, we used Lemma 4.4 to
measure the increase of distance over blocks. However, the lemma can only measure the
progress up to some small constant. It is known that if the number of copies T is larger then
Ω(1/ε2), where ε is the statistical distance of original copy, then the statistical distance goes
to 1 exponentially fast. Formally, we use the following lemma.
Lemma 4.6 ([SV99]) Let X and Y be random variables over [M ] such that ∆(X,Y ) ≥ ε.
Let X = (X1, . . . ,XT ) be T i.i.d. copies of X, and let Y = (Y1, . . . , YT ) be T i.i.d. copies of
Y . We have
∆(X,Y) ≥ 1− e−Tε2/2.
We remark that Lemma 4.4 and 4.6 are incomparable. In the parameter range of Lemma
4.4, Lemma 4.6 only gives ∆(X,Y) ≥ Ω(Tε2) instead of Ω(√Tε). To argue that the overall
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distribution is far from having small collision probability, we introduce the following notion of
nonuniformity.
Definition 4.7 Let X be a random variable over [M ] with probability mass function p. X is
(δ, β)-nonuniform if for every function q : [M ]→ R such that 0 ≤ q(x) ≤ p(x) for all x ∈ [M ],
and
∑
x q(x) ≥ δ, the function satisfies∑
x∈[M ]
q(x)2 > β/M.
Intuitively, a distribution X over [M ] is (δ, β)-nonuniform means that even if we remove
(1 − δ)-fraction of probability mass from X, the “collision probability” remains greater than
β/M . In particular, X is (1− δ)-far from any random variable Y with cp(Y ) ≤ β/M .
Lemma 4.8 Let X be a random variable over [M ]. If X is (1− η)-far from uniform, then X
is (2
√
β · η, β)-nonuniform for every β ≥ 1.
Proof. Let p be the probability mass function of X, and q : [M ] → R be a function such
that 0 ≤ q(x) ≤ p(x) for every x ∈ [M ], and ∑x q(x) ≥ 2√β · η. Our goal is to show that∑
x q(x)
2 > β/M . Let T = {x ∈ [M ] : p(x) ≥ 1/M}. Note that
∆(X,U[M ]) = Pr[X ∈ T ]− Pr[U[M ] ∈ T ] ≥ 1− η.
This implies Pr[X ∈ T ] ≥ 1− η, and µ(T ) = Pr[U[M ] ∈ T ] ≤ η. Now,∑
x∈T
q(x) ≥ 2
√
β · η − Pr[X /∈ T ] ≥ 2
√
β · η − η >
√
β · η,
and µ(T ) ≤ η implies
∑
x∈[M ]
q(x)2 ≥
∑
x∈T
q(x)2 ≥
(∑
x∈T q(x)
)2
|T | >
β
M
.
We are ready to prove Theorem 4.5.
Proof of Theorem 4.5: By Lemma 4.2 with ε =
√
2 ln(128α/δ3)/T < 1/4, there is a flat
K-source X such that for (1−δ/4)-fraction of hash function h ∈ H, h(X) is ε-far from uniform,
for K = Ω((δ/4)2M/ε2) = Ω(δ2MT/ log(α/δ)). We set X = (X1, . . . ,XT ) to be T independent
copies of X. Consider a hash function h such that h(X) is ε-far from uniform. By Lemma
4.6, (h(X1), . . . , h(XT )) is (1 − η)-far from uniform, for η = e−ε2T/2 = δ3/128α. By Lemma
4.8, (h(X1), . . . , h(XT )) is (δ/4, 2α/δ)-nonuniform for (1 − δ/4)-fraction of hash functions h.
By the first statement of Lemma 4.9 below, this implies that (H,Y) is (1 − δ)-far from any
distribution (H ′,Z) with collision probability α/(|H| ·MT ).
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Lemma 4.9 Let (H,Y ) be a joint distribution over H×[M ] such that the marginal distribution
H is uniform over H. Let ε, δ, α be positive real numbers.
1. If Y |H=h is (δ/4, 2α/δ)-nonuniform for at least (1− δ/4)-fraction of h ∈ H, then (H,Y )
is (1− δ)-far from any distribution (H ′, Z) with cp(H ′, Z) ≤ α/(|H| ·M).
2. If Y |H=h is (0.1, 2α/ε)-nonuniform for at least 2ε-fraction-frction of h ∈ H, then (H,Y )
is ε-far from any distribution (H ′, Z) with cp(H ′, Z) ≤ α/(|H| ·M).
Proof. We introduce the following notations first. For every h ∈ H, we define qh : [M ] → R
by
qh(y) = min{Pr[(H,Y ) = (h, y)],Pr[(H ′, Z) = (h, y)]}
for every y ∈ [M ]. We also define f : H → R by
f(h) =
∑
y∈[M ]
qh(y) ≤ Pr[H = h] = 1|H| .
For the first statement, let (H ′, Z) be a random variable over H × [M ] that is (1 − δ)-
close to (H,Y ). We need to show that cp(H ′, Z) > α/(|H| · M). Note that ∑h f(h) =
1 − ∆((H,Y ), (H ′, Z)) ≥ δ. So there are at least a (3δ/4)-fraction of hash functions h with
f(h) ≥ (δ/4)/|H|. At least a (3δ/4) − (δ/4) = δ/2-fraction of h satisfy both f(h) ≥ (δ/4)/|H|
and Y |H=h is (δ/4, 2α/δ)-nonuniform. By the definition of nonuniformity, for each such h, we
have ∑
y∈[M ]T
(|H| · qh(y))2 > 2α
δ ·M .
Therefore,
cp(H ′, Z) ≥
∑
h,y
qh(y)
2 >
(
δ
2
· |H|
)
· 2α
δ · |H|2M =
α
|H| ·M .
Similarly, for the second statement, let (H ′, Z) be a random variable over H × [M ] that
is ε-close to (H,Y ). We need to show that cp(H ′, Z) > α/(|H| ·M). Note that ∑h f(h) =
1−∆((H,Y ), (H ′, Z)) ≥ 1−ε. So there are at least a 1−ε/0.9-fraction of h with f(h) ≥ 0.1/|H|.
At least a 2ε − ε/0.9 > ε/2-fraction of hash functions satisfy both f(h) ≥ 0.1/|H| and Y |H=h
is (0.1, 2α/ε)-nonuniform. By Lemma 4.8, for each such h, we have∑
y∈[M ]
(|H| · qh(y))2 > 2α
ε ·M .
Therefore,
cp(H ′, Z) ≥
∑
h,y
qh(y)
2 >
(ε
2
· |H|
)
· 2α
ε · |H|2M =
α
|H| ·M .
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4.3 Lower Bounds for the Distribution of Hashed Values Only
We can extend our lower bounds to the distribution of hashed sequenceY = (H(X1), . . . ,H(XT ))
along (without H) for both closeness requirements, at the price of losing the dependency on ε
and incurring some dependency on the size of the hash family. Let 2d = |H| be the size of the
hash family. The dependency on d is necessary. Intuitively, the hashed sequence Y contains
at most T ·m bits of entropy, and the input (H,X1, . . . ,XT ) contains at least d + T · k bits
of entropy. When d is large enough, it is possible that all the randomness of hashed sequence
comes from the randomness of the hash family. Indeed, if H is T -wise independent (which is
possible with d ≃ T ·m), then (H(X1), . . . ,H(XT )) is uniform when X1, . . . ,XT are all distinct.
Therefore,
∆((H(X1), . . . ,H(XT )), U[M ]T ) ≤ Pr[ not all X1, . . . ,XT are distinct ]
Thus, K = Ω(T 2) (independent of M) suffices to make the hashed value close to uniform.
Theorem 4.10 Let N,M,T be positive integers, and d a positive real number such that N ≥
MT/d. Let δ ∈ (0, 1), α > 1 be real numbers such that α · 2d < δ3 · eT/32/128. Let H :
[N ] → [M ] be a random hash function from an hash family H of size at most 2d. There
exists an integer K = Ω(δ2MT/d · log(α/δ)), and a block K-source X = (X1, . . . ,XT ) such
that Y = (H(X1), . . . ,H(XT )) is (1 − δ)-far from any distribution Z = (Z1, . . . , ZT ) with
cp(Z) ≤ α/MT . In particular, Y is (1− δ)-far from uniform.
Think of α and δ as constants. Then the theorem says that when the hash function contains
d ≤ T/(32 ln 2)−O(1) bits of randomness, K = Ω(MT/d) is necessary for the hashed sequence
to be close to uniform. For example, in some typical hash applications, N = poly(M) and the
hash function is 2-universal or O(1)-wise independent. In this case, d = O(logM) and we need
K = Ω(MT/ logM). (Recall that our upper bound in Theorem 3.1 says that K = O(MT )
suffices.)
Proof. We will deduce the theorem from Theorem 4.5. Replacing the parameter α by α · 2d
in Theorem 4.5, we know that there exists an integer K = Ω(δ2MT/d · log(α/δ)) and a block
K-source X = (X1, . . . ,XT ) such that (H,Y) = (H,H(X1), . . . ,H(XT )) is (1 − δ)-far from
any distribution (H ′,Z) with cp(H ′,Z) ≤ α · 2d/(2d ·MT ) = α/MT . Now, suppose we are
given a random variable Z on [M ]T with ∆(Y,Z) ≤ 1 − δ. Then we can define an H ′ such
that ∆((H,Y), (H ′,Z)) = ∆(Y,Z) (Indeed, define the conditional distribution H ′|Z=z to equal
H|Y=z for every z ∈ [M ]T .) Then we have
cp(Z) ≥ cp(H ′,Z) > α
MT
.
One limitation of the above lower bound is that it only works when d ≤ T/(32 ln 2)−O(1).
For example, the lower bound cannot be applied when the hash function is T -wise independent.
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Although d = Ω(T ) may not be interesting in practice, for the sake of completeness, we provide
another simple lower bound to cover this parameter region.
Theorem 4.11 Let N,M,T be positive integers, and δ ∈ (0, 1), α > 1, d > 0 real numbers. Let
H : [N ]→ [M ] be a random hash function from an hash family H of size at most 2d. Suppose
K ≤ N be an integer such that K ≤ (δ2/4α · 2d)1/T ·M . Then there exists a block K-source
X = (X1, . . . ,XT ) such that Y = (H(X1), . . . ,H(XT )) is (1 − δ)-far from any distribution
Z = (Z1, . . . , ZT ) with cp(Z) ≤ α/MT . In particular, Y is (1− δ)-far from uniform.
Again, think of α and δ as constants. The theorem says that K = Ω(M/2d/T ) is necessary
for the hashed sequence to be close to uniform. In particular, when d = Θ(T ), K = Ω(M) is
necessary. Theorem 4.10 gives the same conclusion, but only works for d ≤ T/(32 ln 2)−O(1).
On the other hand, when d = o(T ), Theorem 4.10 gives better lower bound K = Ω(MT/d).
Proof. Let X be any flat K-source, i.e., a uniform distribution over a set of size K. We
simply take X = (X1, . . . ,XT ) to be T independent copies of X. Note that Y has support at
most as large as (H,X). Thus,
|supp(Y)| ≤ |supp(H,X)| = 2d ·KT ≤ δ
2
4α
·MT .
Therefore, Y is (1 − δ2/4α)-far from uniform. By Lemma 4.8, Y is (1 − δ)-far from any
distribution Z = (Z1, . . . , ZT ) with cp(Z) ≤ α/MT .
4.4 Lower Bound for 2-universal Hash Functions
In this subsection, we show Theorem 3.1 is almost tight in the following sense. We show that
there exists K = Ω(MT/ε · log(1/ε)), a 2-universal hash family H, and a block K-source X
such that (H,Y) is ε-far from having collision probability 100/(|H| ·MT ). The improvement
over Theorem 4.5 is the almost tight dependency on ε. Recall that Theorem 3.1 says that for
2-universal hash family, K = O(MT/ε) suffices. The upper and lower bound differs by a factor
of log(1/ε). In particular, our result for 4-wise independent hash functions (Theorem 3.5)
cannot be achieved with 2-universal hash functions. The lower bound can further be extended
to the distribution of hashed sequence Y = (H(X1), . . . ,H(XT )) as in the previous subsection.
Furthermore, since the 2-universal hash family we use has small size, we only pay a factor of
O(logM) in the lower bound on K. Formally we prove the following results.
Theorem 4.12 For every prime power M , real numbers ε ∈ (0, 1/4) and α ≥ 1, the fol-
lowing holds. For all integers t and N such that ε · M t−1 ≥ 1 and N ≥ 6εM2t, and for
T = ⌈ε2M2t−1 log(α/ε)⌉,4 there exists an integer K = Ω(MT/ε · log(α/ε)), and a 2-universal
4For technical reason, our lower bound proof does not work for every sufficiently large T . However, note that
the density of T such that the lower bound holds is 1/M2.
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hash family H from [N ] to [M ], and a block K-source X = (X1, . . . ,XT ) such that (H,Y) =
(H,H(X1), . . . ,H(XT )) is ε-far from any distribution (H
′,Z) with cp(H ′,Z) ≤ α/(|H| ·MT ).
Theorem 4.13 For every prime power M , real numbers ε ∈ (0, 1/4) and α ≥ 1, the fol-
lowing holds. For all integers t and N such that ε · M t−1 ≥ 1 and N ≥ 6εM2t, and for
T = ⌈ε2M2t−1 log(αM/ε)⌉, there exists an integer K = Ω(MT/ε · log(αM/ε)), and a 2-
universal hash family H from [N ] to [M ], and a block K-source X = (X1, . . . ,XT ) such that
Y = (H(X1), . . . ,H(XT )) is ε-far from any distribution Z with cp(Z) ≤ α/MT .
Basically, the idea is to show that the Markov Inequality applied in the proof of Theo-
rem 3.1 (see Inequality (1))is tight for a single block. More precisely, we show that there
exists a 2-universal hash family H, and a K-source X such that with probability ε over
h ← H, cp(h(X)) ≥ 1/M + Ω(1/Kε). Intuitively, if we take T = Θ(Kε · log(α/ε)/M) in-
dependent copies of such X, then the collision probability will satisfy cp(h(X1), . . . , h(XT )) ≥
(1 + Ω(M/Kε))T /MT ≥ α/(εMT ), and so the overall collision probability is cp(H,Y) ≥
α/(|H| ·MT ). Formally, we analyze our construction below using Hellinger distance, and show
that the collision probability remains high even after modifying a Θ(ε)-fraction of distribution.
Proof of Theorem 4.12: Fix a prime power M , and ε > 0, we identify [M ] with the finite
field F of size M . Let t be an integer parameter such that M t−1 > 1/ε. Recall that the set H0
of linear functions {h~a : Ft → F}~a∈Ft where h~a(~x) =
∑
i aixi is 2-universal. Note that picking
a random hash function h←H0 is equivalent to picking a random vector ~a← Ft. Two special
properties of H0 are (i) when ~a = ~0, the whole domain Ft is sent to 0 ∈ F, and (ii) the size
of hash family |H0| is the same as the size of the domain, namely |Ft|. We will use H0 as a
building block in our construction.
We proceed to construct the hash family H. We partition the domain [N ] into several sub-
domains, and apply different hash function to each sub-domain. Let s be an integer parameter
to be determined later. We require N ≥ s ·M t, and partition [N ] into D0,D1, . . . ,Ds, where
each of D1, . . . ,Ds has size M
t and is identified with Ft, and D0 is the remaining part of [N ].
In our construction, the data X will never come from D0. Thus, wlog, we can assume D0 is
empty. For every i = 1, . . . , s, we use a linear hash function h~ai ∈ H0 to send Di to F. Thus,
a hash function h ∈ H consists of s linear hash function (h~a1 , . . . , h~as), and can be described
by s vectors ~a1, . . . ,~as ∈ Ft. Note that to make H 2-universal, it suffices to pick ~a1, . . . ,~as
pairwise independently. Specifically, we identify Ft with the finite field Fˆ of size M t, and pick
(~a1, . . . ,~as) by picking a, b ∈ Fˆ, and output (a+α1 · b, a+α2 · b, . . . , a+αs · b) for some distinct
constants α1, . . . , αs ∈ Fˆ. Formally, we define the hash family to be
H = {ha,b : [N ]→ [M ]}a,b∈Fˆ, where ha,b = (ha+α1b, . . . , ha+αsb)
def
= (ha,b1 , . . . , h
a,b
s ).
It is easy to verify that H is indeed 2-universal, and |H| =M2t.
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We next define a single block K-source X that makes the Markov Inequality (1) tight. We
simply take X to be a uniform distribution over D1 ∪ · · · ∪Ds, and so K = s ·M t. Consider
a hash function ha,b ∈ H. If all ha,bi are non-zero and distinct, then ha,b(X) is the uniform
distribution. If exactly one ha,bi = 0, then h
a,b sends M t + (s − 1)M t−1 elements in [N ] to 0,
and (s − 1)M t−1 elements to each nonzero y ∈ F. Let us call such ha,b bad hash functions.
Thus, if ha,b is bad, then
cp(ha,b(X)) =
(
M t + (s− 1)M t−1
K
)2
+ (M − 1) ·
(
(s − 1)M t−1
K
)2
=
1
M
+
M − 1
s2M
≥ 1
M
+
1
2s2
.
Note that ha,b is bad with probability
Pr[exactly one ha,bi = 0] = Pr[b 6= 0 ∧ ∃i (a+ αib = 0)] =
(
1− 1
M t
)
· s
M t
≥ s
2M t
.
We set s = ⌈4εM t⌉ ≤M t. It follows that with probability at least 2ε over h←H, the collision
probability satisfies cp(h(X)) ≥ 1/M + 1/(4Kε), as we intuitively desired. However, instead
of working with collision probability directly, we need to use Hellinger closeness to measure
the growth of distance to uniform (see Definition 3.9.) The following claim upper bounds the
Hellinger closeness of h(X) for bad hash functions h. The proof of the claim is deferred to the
end of this section.
Claim 4.14 Suppose h is a bad hash function defined as above, then the Hellinger closeness
of h(X) satisfies C(h(X)) ≤ 1−M/(64Kε).
Finally, for every integer T ∈ [ε2M2t−1 log(α/ε), c0 · ε2M2t−1 log(α/ε)], we can write T =
c · (64Kε/M) · ln(800α/ε) for some constant c < c0. Let X = (X1, . . . ,XT ) be T independent
copies of X. We now show that K,H,X satisfy the conclusion of the theorem. That is, K =
Ω(MT/(ε log(α/ε))) (as follows from the definition of T ) and (H,Y) = (H,H(X1), . . . ,H(XT ))
is ε-far from any distribution (H ′,Z) with cp(H ′,Z) ≤ α/(|H| ·MT ).
Consider the distribution (h(X1), . . . , h(XT )) for a bad hash function h ∈ H. From the
above claim, the Hellinger closeness satisfies
C(h(X1), . . . , h(XT )) = C(h(X))
T ≤ (1−M/64Kε)T ≤ eMT/64Kε ≤ 800α
ε
.
By Lemma 3.10 and the definition of Hellinger closeness, we have
∆((h(X1), . . . , h(XT )), U[M ]T ) ≥ 1− C(h(X1), . . . , h(XT )) ≥ 1−
800α
ε
.
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By Lemma 4.8, (h(X1), . . . , h(XT )) is (0.1, 2α/ε)-nonuniform for at least 2ε-fraction of bad
hash functions h. By the second statement of Lemma 4.9, this implies (H,Y) is ε-far from any
distribution (H ′,Z) with cp(H ′,Z) ≤ α/(|H| ·MT ).
In sum, given M,ε, α, t that satisfies the premise of the theorem, we set K = ⌈4εM t⌉ ·M t,
and proved that for every N ≥ K, and T = Θ((Kε/M) · ln(α/ε)), the conclusion of the theorem
is true. It remains to prove Claim 4.14.
Proof of claim: Let p(x) = M · Pr[h(X) = x] for every x ∈ F. For a bad hash
function h, we have p(0) = (1 + (M − 1)/s), and p(x) = (1− 1/s) for every x 6= 0.
We will upper bound C(h(X)) = (1/M) ·∑x√p(x) using Taylor series. Recall that
for z ≥ 0, there exists some z′, z′′ ∈ [0, z] such that
√
1 + z = 1 +
z
2
+
z2
2
·
(
− 1
4(1 + z′)3/2
)
≤ 1 + z
2
− z
2
8(1 + z)3/2
, and
√
1− z = 1− z · 1
2
√
1− z′′ ≤ 1−
z
2
.
We have
C(h(X)) =
1
M
∑
x
√
p(x)
≤ 1
M
(
1 +
M − 1
2s
− (M − 1)
2
8s2 · (1 + (M − 1)/s)3/2 + (M − 1) ·
(
1− 1
2s
))
= 1− (M − 1)
2
8Ms2(1 + (M − 1)/s)3/2
Recall that M ≥ 2, s = εM t ≥M , and s2 = Kε, we have
C(h(X)) ≤ 1− M
2
64Kε
.
✷
Recall that |H| = M2t. Theorem 4.13 follows from Theorem 4.12 by exactly the same
argument as in the proof of Theorem 4.10.
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A Technical Lemma on Binomial Coefficients
Lemma A.1 (Claim 4.3, restated) Let N,K > 1 be integers such that N > 2K, and L ∈
[0,K/2], β ∈ (0,min{1,√L}) real numbers. Let S ⊂ [N ] be a random subset of size K, and
T ⊂ [N ] be a fixed subset of [N ] of arbitrary size. We have
Pr
S
[
||S ∩ T | − L| ≤ β
√
L
]
≤ O(β).
Proof. By an abuse of notation, we use T to denote the size of set T . The probability can
be expressed as a sum of binomial coefficients as follows.
Pr
S
[
||S ∩ T | − L| ≤ β
√
L
]
=
⌊L+β√L⌋∑
R=⌈L−β√L⌉
(T
R
)(N−T
K−R
)
(
N
K
) .
Note that there are at most ⌊2β√L⌋ + 1 terms, it suffices to show that for every R ∈[
L− β√L,L+ β√L
]
,
f(T )
def
=
(T
R
)(N−T
K−R
)
(
N
K
) ≤ O
(√
1
L
)
.
We use the following bound on binomial coefficients, which can be derived from Stirling’s
formula.
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Claim A.2 For integers 0 < i < a, 0 < j < b, we have(a
i
)(b
j
)
(a+b
i+j
) ≤ O
(√
a · b · (i+ j) · (a+ b− i− j)
i · (a− i) · j · (b− j) · (a+ b)
)
.
Note that L ∈ [0,K/2] implies K −R = Ω(K). When 2R ≤ T ≤ N − 2K + 2R, we have
f(T ) =
(T
R
)(N−T
K−R
)
(
N
K
)
= O
(√
T (N − T )K(N −K)
R(T −R)(K −R)(N − T −K +R)N
)
= O
(√
1
R
· K
K −R ·
N −K
N
· T (N − T )
(T −R)(N − T −K +R)
)
= O
(√
1
R
)
= O
(√
1
L
)
,
as desired. Note that when N > 2K, such T exists. Finally, observe that β2 < L implies
R ≥ 1, and
f(T )
f(T + 1)
=
(T −R+ 1)(N − T )
(T + 1)(N − T −K +R) .
It follows that f(T ) is increasing when T ≤ 2R, and f(T ) is decreasing when T ≥ N−2K+2R.
Therefore, f(T ) ≤ f(2R) = O(
√
1/L) for T ≤ 2R, and f(T ) ≤ f(N − 2K + 2R) = O(
√
1/L)
for T ≥ N − 2K + 2R, which complete the proof.
B Proof of Lemma 4.4
Lemma B.1 (Lemma 4.4, restated) Let X and Y be random variables over [M ] such that
∆(X,Y ) ≥ ε. Let X = (X1, . . . ,XT ) be T i.i.d. copies of X, and let Y = (Y1, . . . , YT ) be T
i.i.d. copies of Y . We have
∆(X,Y) ≥ min{ε0, c
√
T · ε},
where ε0, c are absolute constants.
Proof. We prove the lemma by the following two claims. The first claim reduces the lemma
to the special case that X is a Bernoulli random variable with bias Ω(ε), and Y is a uniform
coin. The second claim proves the special case.
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Claim B.2 Let X and Y be random variables over [M ] such that ∆(X,Y ) = ε. Then there
exists a randomized function f : [M ] → {0, 1} such that f(Y ) = U{0,1}, and ∆(f(X), f(Y )) ≥
ε/2.
Proof of claim: By the definition, there exists a set T ⊂ [M ] such that
|Pr[X ∈ T ]− Pr[Y ∈ T ]| = ε.
With out loss of generality, we can assume that Pr[Y ∈ T ] = p ≤ 1/2 (because we
can take the complement of T .) Let g : [M ]→ {0, 1} be the indicator function of T ,
so we have PrY [g(Y ) = 1] = p. For every x ∈ [M ], we define f(x) = g(x)∨ b, where
b is a biased coin with Pr[b = 0] = 1/(2(1 − p)). The claim follows by observing
that
Pr[f(Y ) = 0] = Pr[g(Y ) = 0 ∧ b = 0] = (1− p) · 1/(2(1 − p)) = 1/2,
and
∆(f(X), f(Y )) ≥ ∆(X,Y ) · Pr[b = 0] ≥ ε/2.
✷
Claim B.3 Let X be a Bernoulli random variable over {0, 1} such that Pr[X = 0] = 1/2 − ε.
Let X = (X1, . . . ,XT ) be T independent copies of X. Then
∆(X, U{0,1}T ) ≥ min{ε0, c
√
Tε},
where ε0, c are absolute constants independent of ε and T .
Proof of claim: For x ∈ {0, 1}T , let the weight wt(x) of x to be the number of
1’s in x. Let
S =
{
x ∈ {0, 1}T : wt(x) ≤ T
2
−
√
T
}
be the subset of {0, 1}T with small weight (This choice of S is the main source
of improvement in our proof compared to that of Reyzin [Rey04], who instead
considers the set of all x with weight at most T/2.) For every x ∈ S, we have
Pr[X = x] ≤ 1
2T
·(1−ε)T/2+
√
T ·(1+ε)T/2−
√
T ≤
(
1−min
{√
T · ε
2
,
1
2
})
·Pr[U{0,1}T = x].
By standard results on large deviation, we have
Pr[U{0,1}T ∈ S] ≥ Ω(1).
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Combining the above two inequalities, we get
∆(X, U{0,1}T ) ≥ Pr[U{0,1}T ∈ S]− Pr[X ∈ S]
≥
(
1−
(
1−min
{√
T · ε
2
,
1
2
}))
· Pr[U{0,1}T ∈ S]
≥ min
{√
T · ε
2
,
1
2
}
· Ω(1)
= min{c
√
Tε, ε0}
for some absolute constants c, ε0, which completes the proof. ✷
Note that applying the same randomized function f on two random variables X and Y can-
not increase the statistical distance. I.e., ∆(f(X), f(Y )) ≤ ∆(X,Y ). The lemma following
immediately by the above two claims:
∆(X,Y) ≥ ∆(((f1(X1), . . . , fT (XT )), ((f1(Y1), . . . , fT (YT ))
≥ min{ε0, c
√
Tε}
where f1, . . . , fT are independent copies of randomized function defined in Claim B.2, and ε0, c
are absolute constants from Claim B.3.
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